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 I. Introduction 
 Lifelong employment has been an integral aspect to the Japanese lifestyle 
since the 1950s.  However, due to new attitudes among young Japanese that 
emerged post-war, this tradition is gradually changing.  More members of the 
younger generations are deciding on other career paths that express creativity or 
individuality instead of the life of a typical “salaryman” or “office lady.”  The 
modernization of Japan that occurred during the 1870s has affected post-war 
Japan in the late 1980s.  After 1955, the younger generations of Japan participated 
in what some scholars, such as Kawasaki, call soft individualism (1994, p. 196).  
This soft individualism has gradually given way to expressionalism in the 2000s, 
resulting in a more materialistic, less group-oriented Japan.  In addition, Japanese 
women are contributing to the shift from traditional Japanese work practices.  
Many women wish to be more independent, and in order to achieve this, they feel 
as if they must emulate Western practices or lifestyles, where lifelong 
employment is not as common.  This paper will exemplify the reasons why 
opinions among contemporary Japanese have changed.  It will further clarify why 
the Japanese culture has turned to consumerism and consequently is beginning to 
reject the rigid routine of the salaryman or office lady.  To illustrate this social 
transformation of Japan, I have surveyed twenty-seven Japanese students that 
reside within the vicinity of Tokyo concerning their opinions about lifelong 
employment and their own futures.  In addition to this, I will explain my own 
observances while studying abroad in Japan in 2009.  Due to a shift in cultural 
values from the 1980s to the present, as well as a series of economic recessions, 
the Japanese salaryman, and the tradition of lifelong employment in general, may 
be on the road to gradual extinction. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Lifelong employment is unusual in most countries, but in Japan, it has 
been commonplace and was even expected at firms during the latter half of the 
twentieth century.  The practice of hiring employees for life became prominent in 
Japan during the 1970s after it was established during the 1950s as a negotiation 
between workers and their administration (Wolff, 2008, p. 63).  Along with 
“seniority-based wages and enterprise unions”, the title of salaryman is regarded 
“as one of the ‘three sacred treasures’ in Japanese industrial relations” (Wolff, 
2008, p. 56).  A salaryman, or sarariman, is the term used to refer to white-collar 
company employees that earn salaries “based on individual abilities rather than on 
seniority” (Robertson, 2005, p. 131).  Their unyielding loyalty is a result of the 
“three sacred treasures” and consequently, salarymen are known for working long 
hours at the office, sometimes up to sixty hours per week (Shibata, 2007, p. 3).  
There is not much time for family if one becomes a salaryman.  It is thought that 
the amount of time spent at the workplace correlates to the perceived efficiency of 
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the employee.  Many salarymen even work themselves to death, known as karoshi, 
or become depressed to the point where they commit suicide.   Suicide rates are a 
problem among the Japanese because of the amount of stress work induces.  
While studying abroad in Japan during spring of 2009, I experienced many 
delayed trains due to Japanese salarymen leaping in front of them.  Other cases 
include death by “subarachnoidal hemorrhage, heart failure, cerebral haemorrhage 
or myocardial infarction” (Palumbo, 1994).  The life of a salaryman is arduous 
and depressing, but they toil on for the benefit of the entire corporation. 
 
 Lifelong employment, according to Sullivan, is “the practice whereby 
large Japanese firms hire many of their employees directly from high school or 
university, employees who are expected to stay with the firm or its subsidiary 
companies until at least the time of normal retirement between 55 and 60 years of 
age” (1991, p. 79, as cited by Woronoff and Billesbach).  Wolff claims that 
lifelong employment in Japan is not a law, as it “never forms part of any explicit 
contractual promise… [It] is an ‘unwritten… guarantee’, a ‘social norm’, or a 
‘moral imperative’” (2008, p. 56).  In return for their adamant loyalty, the 
company nearly refuses to fire any of its workers unless it is in the “direst set of 
circumstances” (Sullivan, 1991, p. 79).  Lifelong employment is beneficial to 
corporations because it provides dedicated, steady, previously trained and highly 
skilled employees (Sullivan, 1991, p. 80).   
 
 One of the models used to provide explanation for the Japanese tradition 
of lifelong employment is social unity.  The Japanese are known for strictly 
adhering to their cultural norms of solidarity.  Borovoy states that the ideal 
Japanese society is one that is “cohesive, protective, and secure, rather than one in 
which the individual can freely exercise the right to be different” (2008, p. 552).  
Standing out and expressing oneself is looked down upon; loyalty to the larger 
group as a whole is paramount in Japanese culture.  One should not upset the 
balance of relationships if one can help it.  These cultural norms perpetuate an 
environment conducive to lifelong employment. 
 
Escaping from the strict cultural patterns of Japanese solidarity can be 
very difficult.  However, a closer examination of Japanese youth during the 1980s 
to the 2000s shows that some have broken free from these social expectations.  
Many young Japanese are abandoning the cultural traditions of conformity and 
cohesion in exchange for a type of individualism or expressionism.  As “advanced 
mass consumer societies progress”, Kawasaki asserts, “expressionism adopts 
more superficial standards” (1994, p. 196).  As early as 1955, the younger 
generations of Japan began participating in a phenomenon called “soft 
individualism” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196).   Soft individualism is less connected 
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“with the inner or intrinsic self” or with the genuine expression of one’s 
personality (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196).  Instead, it tends to focus more on 
materialism and conforming to the rest of the population.  However, in the 1990s 
and 2000s, younger generations in Japan have become active participants of 
expressionism, which is more concerned with self-actualization.  Expressionism is 
an “adaptive lifestyle... [where] what one expresses has a significant meaning and 
is highly valued” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196).  Because of expressionism, Japanese 
youths have begun to actively pursue their wants rather than conforming to the 
group.  In order to exert individuality and independence, they emulate the West 
and its consumer cultures.  They see the United States as a symbol of 
individuality and independence and thus, try to follow its ways.  With soft 
individualism and expressionism replacing loyalty and conformity, Japanese 
lifelong employment has become endangered. 
 
The state of the Japanese economy also plays a role in the drift away from 
the Japanese tradition of lifelong employment.  Previously, lifelong employment 
benefitted the Japanese economy by providing “a stable work force of 
experienced employers; loyal cadres due to job security guarantees; and better 
trained workers” (Sullivan, 1991, p. 79).  However, with “Japan mired in an 
economic slump during the 1990s and into the early 2000s, some commentators 
were predicting the ‘death’ or deinstitutionalization of lifelong employment” 
(Wolff, 2008, p. 54).  Normally, Japanese employers would make the choice to 
have the firm suffer rather than let employees go.  However, when recessions as 
difficult as the ones from 1990 to the early 2000s hit, Japanese corporations began 
to make different decisions regarding their own labor forces.  Parry argues that the 
“salaryman’s habitat has deteriorated rapidly since the world financial crisis 
began but the change began in the early 1990s when Japan's postwar boom 
faltered” (2009, p. 39).  Instead of holding onto each employee, companies hire 
expendable “dispatch workers” temporarily or part-time, while loyal workers are 
laid off (Parry, 2009, p. 39).  Due to the series of slumps in the Japanese and 
global economy, Japanese salarymen may find themselves out of the office and 
onto welfare lines.  
 
Gender issues also factor into the fate of lifelong employment in Japan.  
Since the late 1800s, Japanese women have also been affected by the process of 
globalization.  They began to adapt to the individualistic, consumerist lifestyle of 
the West, which ultimately impacts the corporate environment.  Hirakawa 
maintains that  
female critics [who support the ideal lifestyle of Japanese women] often 
encourage [them] to defect to the liberated West, criticizing Japanese 
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society and the Japanese male as hopelessly mired in tradition (Hirakawa, 
2004, p. 424).   
Many Japanese women would prefer an American husband over a Japanese one, 
believing that if they marry a non-Japanese husband, he will treat her with respect 
as an equal.  There is a desire to shift from “feudal relations, associated with 
obligation and hierarchy, to democratic relations, characterized by choice” 
(Tobin, 1994, p. 107).  They believe that marrying a Japanese man signifies the 
opposite of modernity and independence.   
 
Consequently, many Japanese women attempt to emulate Western 
practices or lifestyles in order to exercise more independence.  This increased 
need for independence and expression of individuality infiltrates attitudes in the 
work environment.  However, according to Robertson, many Japanese women do 
not hold significant or managerial company positions (2004, p. 132).  By 
ultimately segregating women and not allowing them to enjoy the benefits of 
lifelong employment, the percentage of businesspeople hired for life at Japanese 
corporations is inevitably going to decrease from now on. 
 
Because of the emergence of a consumer culture, a shift away from 
Confucian values, a weakened economy, and gender issues, this paper will 
explain the decline of lifelong employment in Japan since the 1980s. 
 
III. Methodological Approach 
The method I chose to analyze the changes that are occurring in 
contemporary Japanese society is a combination of reviewing existing literature, 
empirical analysis, and personal observation.  In order to conduct empirical 
research, I constructed a survey that asked a number of open-ended questions.  I 
surveyed twenty-seven Japanese contemporaries, ages ranging from eighteen to 
twenty-four.1  The questions asked pertained to the opinions of the participant 
concerning lifelong employment in Japan and his or her future plans after 
graduating from a university.  I also inquired whether or not he or she believed 
that the practice of lifelong employment has helped or hurt the economy of Japan 
and if he or she wishes to work for a company in the future that exercises this 
tradition.  In addition, the participant was asked to list the occupations of their 
                                                
1 I sought originally at least fifty respondents.  The method of distribution I used was to ask ten 
friends currently residing in Japan and have them ask five Japanese college-age friends to 
complete and return my survey to me via e-mail.  I received twenty-seven completed surveys and 
because it was not the volume I anticipated, my results may be skewed or ambiguous.  In no way 
do my surveys represent all of Japan’s population; it is merely a sample size of a bigger picture.  
Surveying college age or entry-level Japanese serves as an indicator for their future career choices 
and opinions on lifelong employment. 
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mothers and fathers.  I will compare and contrast data collected from other 
scholars from the 1990s to the information that I have gathered in 2009.  Some of 
the issues I will consider are the tendency of Japanese contemporaries to choose 
an occupation similar to that of a parent, if the participant thinks that lifelong 
employment is viable for the economy of Japan, and the reasons to why or why 
not he or she hopes for lifelong employment in the same profession. 
 
The third method that I have utilized to examine the change in attitudes of 
contemporary Japanese students is observational primary research.  By simply 
noticing certain happenings or the habits of Japanese people that fell into the 
college student age or entry-level age, I could gather some information about their 
behaviors.  Passive observance allows the spectator a small glimpse into a part of 
their daily lives, whether it be on the trains, out on the street, at school, and so 
on.2 
 
To supplement my observational primary research, I will also refer to a 
number of personal dialogues with Japanese friends or acquaintances during my 
semester in Japan.  These conversations have given me insight into how college-
age Japanese students feel about their future and employment post-graduation. 
 
IV. Why Has Lifelong Employment Been Prominent in Japan until the 
1980s? 
 The following models are possible explanations for why lifelong 
employment exists in Japan.  Some scholars attribute it to the distinct culture of 
Japan, while others believe it emerged due to organizations wishing to exert more 
control over their employees.  Another opinion for the existence of lifelong 
employment is based on economics. 
 
Collectivist Culture 
The fierce loyalty that Japanese businessmen exert is often explained via 
Japan’s unique culture.  Japanese society is noted for its solidarity and sense of 
social responsibility, which most likely stems from a relatively homogenous 
population.  The CIA World Factbook reports that with a population of 
127,078,679 as of July 2009, ninety-eight and a half percent are Japanese, while 
the other one and a half percent is comprised of Koreans, Chinese, and other 
ethnicities (CIA – The World Factbook – Japan, 2009).  Japanese culture expects 
its members to be obedient, disciplined, self-inhibited, and harmonious towards 
                                                
2 Obviously, there are limitations to observational primary research.  I did not talk to the people 
that I observed while I was in Japan, and while the behavior of one or a few particular Japanese 
people does not represent the entire population of Japan, I may be able to come to some 
conclusions based on a few case studies or small details that I picked up between these encounters. 
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the group (Borovoy, 2008, p. 553).  In Japan, people are concerned more for the 
community as a whole than themselves as individuals.  The lower class has a 
desire to work with others, while the upper class has obligations to help those 
subordinate to them.  There is a certain harmony, peace, and balance between 
people.  These characteristics of Japanese culture facilitate the nature of the 
corporate environment.  Japanese businesspeople devote a large portion of their 
lives to their respective firms because they are doing so for the benefit of the 
company as a whole.  They put their health, their families, and their personal time 
aside in order to devote themselves entirely to a larger group.  Although Japanese 
culture places a great emphasis on family, it seems as if some salarymen replace 
their families with their corporations.  Businesspeople “see the firm as a substitute 
family which, in turn, fosters cooperative, collegiate relationships” (Wolff, 2008, 
p. 62).  Japanese salarymen often neglect their families in order to put in longer 
hours at the corporation.   
 
Obligations or duties are another important aspect of Japanese political 
culture.  Japanese salarymen carry out their corporate duties on a daily basis; the 
obligations that exist between social classes are comparable to the ones that are 
apparent in the firm.  Japanese culture is considered to be collectivist on a vertical 
scale, meaning that it is an authority-ranking culture where there are profound 
psychological relationships between leaders and followers.  For example, instead 
of a handshake, which is an indicator of equality, the Japanese greet each other 
with a bow.  The lower one bows, the more respect he or she is showing.  In most 
Japanese firms, there is no room for promotions or horizontal mobility.  The 
majority of Japanese corporations are vertically integrated; this organizational 
pattern “guarantees diligence by employees and the paternal benevolence of 
employers… The preference for harmony over conflict ensures industrial peace 
and the humanistic practices of personnel managers” (Wolff, 2008, p. 62).   
 
The emphasis on education also influences culture, which, in turn, shapes 
the Japanese corporate environment.  Post-war Japan became a “diploma society”, 
which entails that “over the course of several decades, educational careers became 
linked with the lifetime employment system and effectively became a stamp on 
individuals that is treated as an ascribed status” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 195).  This 
facilitates the collectivism that emerges in the workplace.  Individualism and 
voluntarism are suppressed, and consequently, relations among the group are in 
more or less in agreement (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 195).  There is a certain order in 
Japanese society that infiltrates every aspect of life.  Lifelong employment is an 
integral part to the Japanese industrial lifestyle.  It enhances its cohesiveness, its 
offers its members protection, and it is secure (Borovoy, 2008, p. 552). 
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Political or Control Model 
The political or control model states that lifelong employment was first 
implemented so managers could regulate their companies more easily.  This 
model holds that “social relations and strategic political choices govern the design 
of the economy” (Wolff, 2008, p. 65).  Employment for life was established in 
order to keep peace within the business environment.  By limiting their 
employees’ choices, corporations had much more control over the workforce in 
terms of pay or switching them to different offices while taking away the option 
of leaving altogether.  Wolff cites Wilthagen and Tros, arguing that with this, 
companies gained a sense of flexicurity, which is a “balance between security of 
tenure and flexibility of working conditions” (Wolff, 2008, p. 65). 
 
Economic or Market Model 
 Another lesser used explanation for the practice of lifelong employment in 
Japan is the market model.  It assumes that workers are self-regarding, rational 
beings and that the Japanese market demonstrates neo-classical growth theory 
(Wolff, 2008, p. 61).  According to Sullivan, under the economic model, Japanese 
employees will try to find security in the form of lifelong employment (1991, p. 
84).  In order to entice skilled workers to join their corporations, managers offered 
them the guarantee of employment for life.   
 
Japanese Student Surveys 
 In order to understand how Japanese youth of the 2000s feel about lifelong 
employment, I constructed and distributed a survey during autumn 2009 to my 
college age Japanese students.  Included in the survey were questions that asked 
the participant’s age, gender, occupations of mother and father; the participant’s 
plans after graduating from college; his or her opinion on lifelong employment; 
whether or not he or she believed lifelong employment helped the economy of 
Japan; if he or she wished to work for a company that guaranteed lifelong 
employment; and the reasons why or why not.   
 
 Out of the twenty-six students surveyed, ages ranging from eighteen to 
twenty-four, fifteen, more than half, had fathers that were salarymen or office 
workers.  Three had fathers that were doctors, and the remaining eight had fathers 
that were self-employed or owned his own business, were pharmacists, or 
accountants.  
7
Wingate: Japanese Salarymen
Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2011
 
Out of the same group, ten had mothers that were housewives.  Four others had 
mothers that worked part-time jobs in addition to housekeeping.  Two had 
mothers that were secretaries or office ladies.  The remaining ten had mothers that 
had specific occupations, such as owners of insurance companies, pharmacists, or 
accountants.   
 
To compare whether or not the younger generations of Japanese were following in 
the footsteps of their parents, participants were asked their plans post-graduation.  
Three out of twenty-seven students were unsure, while four planned to continue 
their education.  Four knew that they just wanted to enter the workforce, and 
eleven had specific jobs or fields in mind.  Only four out of the twenty-seven 
surveyed students, fifteen percent, thought they would become a salaryman or an 
office lady.   
8
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These survey results illustrate the change in views between generations.  Twenty-
two out of twenty-seven students, or eighty-one percent, have post-graduate plans 
other than becoming salarymen or office ladies.  While the majority of mothers 
were housewives, none of the twenty-two females surveyed planned on becoming 
housekeepers after graduating from college.  Forty-four percent of surveyed 
students had specific occupations in mind, such as working for a publisher, 
owning their own company, becoming a banker, or English teacher.   
 
College-age and entry-level Japanese of 2009 have different mindsets 
regarding careers from their parents and the previous generation.  Even during the 
1990s, according to Herbig, Japanese college-age students were selecting 
occupations that “call for some creativity and a degree of independence”, 
illustrating “the desire for more freedom of expression” (1995, p. 51).  This trend 
is continuing during the 2000s, and will probably escalate as even more time goes 
on, thus threatening the custom of lifelong employment in Japan.  The choices of 
their parents are affecting the decisions of younger generations less and less.  No 
longer do they routinely follow in the footsteps of tradition; instead, contemporary 
Japanese youth are making choices for themselves, expressing their own wants, 
and exploring their individuality and independence. 
 
 Although ten out of twenty-six surveyed students saw the tradition of 
lifelong employment in Japan as a beneficial system, three students saw it as a 
drawback, and the remaining thirteen students either believed it was neither good 
nor bad or saw both the benefits and disadvantages of lifelong employment.    
9
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Survey participants believed the lifelong employment system is beneficial 
because it offers employees security, gives them motivation to work diligently, 
fosters a sense of unity, and health insurance and bonus systems are based on it.  
Negative aspects of lifelong employment, according to the students, included the 
lack of motivation it generates because employees get paid regardless of 
performance, its dullness or monotony, and its inflexibility when considering the 
mobility of people or job-switching.  At least seven students alluded to changing 
values, individuality, or changing career paths and stated that employees should 
not be pressured into staying with one company for their entire lives.   
 
 Sixteen out of twenty-six students believed that the tradition of lifelong 
employment has helped the economy of Japan, and seventeen out of twenty-five 
participants answered yes when asked if they wanted to work for a company that 
offers lifelong employment.  Most of their reasons included that in the poor state 
of the economy of 2009, job security is important, if they have a stable career, 
they can concentrate more on their work, and it will motivate them if they stay 
with one company for a long period of time.  Furthermore, four out of twenty-
seven students wanted to work for a company that guaranteed lifelong 
employment for reasons related to gender issues.  Some participants 
acknowledged that it is difficult for women to find jobs in Japan.  In addition, 
some students believed that lifelong employment would help women who leave 
work to get married or have children, or would be beneficial for working mothers 
in general. 
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However, nine out of twenty-seven students had reasons why they would not want 
to work at the same organization for the rest of their lives.   
 
Although my survey results are mixed, suggesting some ambivalence, 
there are also reasons that uphold my hypothesis that the values and attitudes of 
Japanese youth culture are changing and are leaning farther away from the 
occupations of salarymen, office ladies, and lifelong employment.  Some of the 
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reasons for not wanting lifelong employment included wanting to try many 
different companies.  Some students know that they will not work for one 
organization for the rest of their lives, others wished to be evaluated not by their 
loyalty but by their actual work, some students are still searching for what they 
are truly called to do.  With more viewpoints such as these emerging in Japan, it 
signifies the change in the quality of life, thus making the tradition of lifelong 
employment less desirable to Japanese youth.  Many college-age and entry-level 
Japanese are searching for a career that will suit them, not simply taking a 
position and working for life for one particular company.   
 
Comparisons Between 1990s and 2000s Japanese Youth 
 In comparison with the results Lee-Cunin found, Japanese youth of 2009 
and of the 1990s have very similar mindsets.  Lee-Cunin asked Japanese students 
their ideal job and the job that they would probably obtain.  The most prominent 
ideal job was civil servant, the second was accountant, and the third ideal job was 
unknown.  Realistically, most students did not know their future occupation.   
  
“Many reflected their awareness of graduate unemployment” due to the recession 
during the 1990s (Lee-Cunin, 2004, p. 124).  Similarly, many students that 
participated in the 2009 survey expressed concern about finding employment in 
the midst of economic downturn.  Stability and security were important to both 
groups of students.  However, employment for life may not be an option with a 
poor economy; companies might not even hire students right after they complete 
their college education. 
 
 In regards to following the traditions of the older generations, some 
Japanese students from over a decade ago wanted similar occupations to those of 
their parents.  Lee-Cunin asserted that the  
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parental employment status of some of the students could... be an 
influential factor in these results... Students would be more aware of the 
advantages or disadvantages of occupations that their parents had” (2004, 
p. 125).   
Compared to the results of the 2009 survey, more and more Japanese students are 
opting for occupations that are different from their predecessors. 
 
 One survey group from the 1990s reflected a level of individuality 
comparable to that of the 2009 students.    
 
This group of Japanese students expressed “an individual flair regarding their 
ideal job” (Lee-Cunin, 2004, p. 125).  Similarly, participants from the 2009 
survey group expressed individualism not only by aspiring for specific jobs such 
as working for a publisher, English teacher, or a career using French language 
skills, but also by stating that they are going to search for an occupation that suits 
them or that they plan on experiencing multiple jobs throughout their lifetime.   
 
 Both survey groups also exemplified gender issues.  Some participants in 
the 1990s group knew they faced gender discrimination and thus expressed 
concern about obtaining a job as a female.  Some female students believed that 
they ultimately might end up as office ladies, “the gender-specific low status 
position with few chances of promotion” (Lee-Cunin, 2004, p. 126).  Four out of 
twenty-seven participants in the 2009 group also expressed concern over 
discrimination in the workplace.  However, the difference between the two groups 
is that the students surveyed in 2009 did not have an overwhelming majority 
planning to become office ladies post-graduation, whereas the 1990s group did.   
 
13
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 The two survey groups illustrate the increasing trend of individuality and 
expressionism among the Japanese youth.   “15.4 per cent” of the 1990s group 
believed that, realistically, they would become salarymen, the second prominent 
reality occupation (Lee-Cunin, 2004, p. 126).3  Meanwhile the 2009 group gave 
reasons why they would probably not work for only one company for life.  The 
2009 group showed an increase in not choosing an occupation based on those of 
their parents.  However, both groups exemplified the gender issues still facing 
women in the work environment and the concern of finding a job in an 
unfavorable economy.   
 
V. Why the Change?  
The Decline of Lifelong Employment and Endangered Salarymen 
 Lifelong employment was able to thrive up until the 1980s because 
traditional Confucian values were upheld extensively in Japanese society, namely 
“loyalty, discipline, and sincerity” (Robertson, 2005, p. 382).  One was perceived 
to possess strength if he or she was able to put others before his or herself.  Prior 
to urbanization in the 1950s, rural values promoted social obligation and 
harmony, which facilitated lifelong employment in the work environment.  As 
urbanization occurred, however, there was a loss of Confucian values, which were 
replaced by new ones such as individualism and expressionism in a consumer 
culture. 
 
About Modern Japan – The Process of Industrialization 
Modernization officially began for Japan when United States Commodore 
Matthew C. Perry and his fleet of black ships opened up the country from a long 
period of isolation in 1853 (Adams, 2009, p. 37).  Since this occurrence, the 
Japanese have wanted to emulate the ways of the West.  “As early as 1858... the 
only way for Japan to cope with the West was to ‘imitate [the] good things which 
the enemy has’” (Adams, 2009, p. 37).  The leaders during the Meiji period 
already knew that they really had no choice but to imitate Euro-American 
countries (Robertson, 2005, p. 40).  Despite the contempt that the Japanese had 
for the United States and Europe, they wanted to acquire the technological skills 
of the West while still retaining their Japaneseness.  They may not have liked 
Westerners, but they, too, wished to benefit from certain aspects of Western 
culture.  Thus, the Meiji Restoration, which took place from 1868 to 1912, 
“transformed feudal Japan into a nation state” (Adams, 2009, p. 37).   
                                                
3 Although both Lee-Cunin and I found about fifteen per cent of surveyed students in the 1990s 
and 2009 groups, respectively, that planned or saw themselves as salarymen or office ladies in the 
future, my data may be skewed due to less participants (2004, p. 126).  However, despite my 
limitations, the data collected from the 2009 group offers a sampling of a larger population of 
Japanese youth culture. 
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The Japanese perceived Western ideals, science, and technology, 
essentially, industrialization, as a symbol of worldly status.  The Japanese felt the 
need to compete with the United States on a technological level almost instantly.   
They embraced modernization but did so in a way that combined their distinctive 
culture with the advances that other countries had made during the time period 
they spent isolated under the Tokugawa.  This is how Japan was able to 
successfully industrialize. 
 
The modernization that occurred in Japan during the late 1800s continued 
throughout the 1900s.  With this, a “global culture of consumption… patterned on 
American developments” emerged during the early 1900s (Gordon, 1993, p. 242).  
The time period between World War I and World War II, also known as the 
interwar period, was integral to Japanese modernization (Harootunian, 2001, p. 
xi).  Accelerated changes occurred especially in 1955 and after; this was when the 
mass culture of Japan came into being (Gordon, 1993, p. 242).  As Japan became 
more urbanized, cities quickly grew, becoming centers of “machines, speed, and 
capitalist production and consumption” (Adams, 2004, p. 71).   
 
It was this very era of capitalism that bred the concept of white-collar 
workers known as salarymen.  After Japan underwent industrialization, Japanese 
companies gave up on intimate, personal ties.  “[Intermediating], direct 
interpersonal relationships” were weakened, thus leading to the competitive 
nature of the workplace (Shibata, 2007, p. 309).  The salaryman’s allegiance to 
the firm  
has little to do with concrete relationships with co-workers, and the target 
of their 'loyalty' (i.e., the 'corporation') is a discursively constructed and 
aestheticized object that they imagine to directly belong to without any 
mediating social relationship (Shibata, 2007, p. 309).  
 
New Values 
 There were two occurrences that led to a change in values among young 
Japanese people that has led to a decline in the appeal of lifelong employment and 
the salaryman career track.  The first was the process of urbanization.  Once 
standards of living changed for youth culture in Japan, “it was necessary for urban 
Japanese to deny rural values”, for example, social collectivism, and instead 
“create new urban values” such as “a new configuration of group consciousness 
and individualism” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 189, 188).  There was “an inconsistency 
[that] existed between the students’ goals and the necessities of an urban lifestyle” 
that led to the change in what was important to them (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 189).  
Urbanization bred the consumer culture that welcomed the youth of Japan into the 
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world, which has caused the youths of Japan to assess value differently and 
facilitated the need to express themselves.     
 
The second instance that led to the value shift among Japanese youth 
culture was the generation gap that was created between the young and the old 
due to industrialization.  According to Kawasaki, there are four waves of Japanese 
youth culture based on chronology and the urbanization process of Japan.  The 
first group existed before the 1870s prior to industrialization occurring; the 
second group was the actual urban youth culture that transpired and peaked during 
the interwar period of 1880 to 1950; the third group of Japanese youth 
experienced rapid economic growth from 1950 to the 1970s; and the fourth is 
what Kawasaki refers to as the partakers in an “advanced consumption culture” 
living in Japan during the latter 1970s and beyond (1994, p. 186-189).  These four 
waves of youth culture had mindsets that differed from their predecessors.  Older 
conservatives saw the process of modernization “frightening” and “could not cope 
with the freedom and autonomy of the new urban ways” (Adams, 2009, p. 42).  
They felt that the “new consumerism, self-gratification, and open sexuality were 
too threatening” (Adams, 2009, p. 42).  The combination of urbanization and the 
generation gap lead to a change in youth values that Japan had never seen before.  
“Unlike their parents, such individuals find identity not through participation in a 
pattern of reciprocal obligation, but through the goods they purchase” (Tobin, 
1994, p. 108).  The older generation, affected by World War II, learned how to 
save and conserve material goods also how to put others first.  In contrast, the 
younger generations of Japan were not affected by the war directly and feel less 
compelled to save money or food (Herbig, 1995, p. 54).  Brought up in an age of 
consumerism and capitalism, they take a more self-centered approach to life. 
 
As products of modernization, Japanese youth have forgotten about 
Confucian values that allow lifelong employment to thrive.  Some of the 
participants of the 2009 survey have exemplified new values of individuality 
instead of solidarity through their future career choices and reasons for shunning 
lifelong employment.  To some Japanese youth, modernization signifies 
individualization; self-sacrifice no longer has significance (Robertson, 2005, p. 
382). Instead, Japanese youth feel a sense of entitlement without a sense of 
obligation.  Because they were born in the midst of post-war consumer society, 
they experienced affluence instantly. 
Being lazy, having fun and enjoying life are good things; to sweat and 
work are not trendy.  Shinjinrui tend to be practical, easy-going and 
disturbingly money-minded. They are inclined to work to live than live to 
work and are much less ready to submerge their personal ambitions and 
private lives to the success of the company... Japan's youth often wish to 
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wrap the minimum amount of work around their play (Herbig, 1995, p. 
51). 
Due to the effects of globalization, jobs have become more flexible, thus Japanese 
youth feel that they do not need to work as much or as diligently.  With the 
internet, the culture of the workplace has changed, even going as far as to bring 
work to people’s homes.  Being raised in an affluent post-war society constantly 
being shaped by globalization, young Japanese have grown up with a new sense 
of values from those of the previous generations. 
 
Consumer Culture That Emerged 
As mentioned previously, there were four waves of Japanese youth culture 
that emerged prior to industrialization, during the interwar period, post-war, and 
post-economic crisis.  It was the modernization that took place during the 1800s 
and the 1900s that laid the groundwork for capitalistic expansion and gave birth to 
a consumer culture in Japan.  During the late 1800s, Japan became more 
urbanized by establishing a system of currency, by practicing capitalism, and by 
introducing consumer goods into society (Adams, 2009, p. 37-38).  Although the 
Japanese adapted Western ways of modernization to suit their own culture, they 
still admired the United States.  Later in the 1920s, “traditional ways were being 
overwhelmed by Americanization, so much that [there was] a ‘spread of mass 
culture and consumption…’ (Adams, 2004, p.71).  Part of the reason why Japan 
embraced consumerism is because it represented American ways.   For example, 
Ginza, one of the most popular shopping districts in Tokyo, was known as  
the cosmopolitan heart of Tokyo, Ginza has been the quintessential 
symbol of America since the 1920s and many Japanese cities sought to 
imitate what in fact was an elite consumer culture. If anything, this 
consumerist culture was more powerful than the sighting of American 
warships in the fateful year of 1853 (Delanty, 2003, p. 116). 
As the population of Japan migrated from the rural areas to cities during 
the early 1900s, they were targeted as consumers, most notably Japanese women 
(Adams, 2004, p. 71).  Because Japan industrialized and adopted a consumer 
culture, there has been a shift in Japanese attitudes.  By placing more emphasis on 
consumer goods, the Japanese were making decisions for themselves based on 
wants and beginning to express individualism.  The Japanese saw consumption as 
a symbol of status.   
For many years, Western-style has been associated not only with status 
and individuality but also with goritekisa, rationality and functionality.  In 
the postwar period, the emphasis was on improving life by supplying each 
home with ‘necessary goods – a small refrigerator, a vacuum cleaner, a 
water heater, a small black-and-white television set.  Although efficiency 
and rationality are still highly valued in contemporary Japan, ‘style’ and 
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fulfillment’ are increasingly the focus of consumer desire  (Tobin, 1992, p. 
115). 
Products fashioned like their American counterparts or goods imported from the 
West gave the Japanese a sense of individuality.  After World War II, especially, 
the Japanese wanted to obtain the feelings of independence that emanated from 
American culture.  As a result, they participated in this modern life of “mass 
consumption of commodity culture” (Harootunian, 2001, xx).  With such 
emphasis on independence and material wants, especially during the 1980s, there 
emerged “a new, feeling-based individual sensibility” (Gordon, 1993, p. 253).   
 
 From my observations while in Japan, I saw that much of this is still the 
same.  Japan is still a country largely based on consumerism and material goods.  
Many of the stores in Japan are for convenience, but the majority of them are for 
shopping.  Many members of the younger generations of Japan are highly 
materialistic, following fashion trends and shopping often for leisure.  I saw this 
in both males and females from the teenage to college age group, although 
probably more so in females.  There is little distinction between needs and wants; 
Japan, with its consumer culture, has changed its people into believing that what 
they want is really what they require.   
 
Shinjinrui 
Perhaps the most significant reason why attitudes towards lifelong 
employment in Japan have changed is due to what some scholars refer to as 
shinjinnrui.  Shinjinrui represents a new youth culture in Japan that emerged 
during the 1980s, literally “a new human species” or “new breed” in comparison 
to older, existing traditions (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 191; Robertson, 2005, p. 141).  
The goal of the shinjinrui is to “be different from everyone else, to do what you 
want” (Herbig, 1995, p. 53-54).  Its members were born into an “affluent, 
wealthy, powerful, influential, arrogant Japan” after the growth in the post-war 
economy (Herbig, 1995, p. 49). Many older generations perceive this new youth 
culture in a negative light, saying that they have “become removed from 
traditional Japanese values” (Robertson, 2005, p. 160).  Shinjinrui are remarkable 
due to three characteristics.  The first is strong adherence to individualism and 
“selfish behavior patterns, in which youth tend to place highest priority on 
individual benefit or values”, the second is partaking in a consumer culture, and 
the third is expressionism, or “the tendency to insist on presenting oneself and the 
individual's attachment to such presentations” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 191).   
 
The Japanese youth culture of the 1980s was different from previous 
generations of Japanese people because they had begun to experiment with 
individualism, but it was not a complete change.  Although it was during this time 
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that differences in attitudes developed a rift between the older and younger 
generations, Japanese youth culture only practiced what Kawasaki calls “soft 
individualism” during the 1980s, meaning that most of their decisions still tended 
to be conformist in nature (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196).  It was difficult to break out 
of the “longstanding traditional culture” or “highly patterned culture” of harmony 
and amenable relationships (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196). 
 
The next generation of Japanese youth culture, the shinjinrui of the 1990s, 
was similarly brought up in environments that facilitated “group mentality”; for 
example, home and school (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 197).  However, during this 
decade,  
group consciousness began to change... [it became] narrower in scope... At 
the same time, their consumer life and lifestyle reflect an individualistic 
side... Their behavioral patterns and thoughts weaken their uniformity and 
orient them in multidimensional directions (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 197). 
Shinjinrui of the 1990s were further along in the practice of true 
individualism; instead of following the group, members of the younger Japanese 
generation were making decisions for themselves and expressing their individual 
personalities.  They were able to exceed and go beyond the traditional patterns of 
Japanese culture of “conflict avoidance” and “peer conformism”, resulting in 
“preferences representing a shift from the formalized and large scale to the more 
individual and small scale” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196).  Because of the distinct 
characteristics shinjinrui of the 1990s exerted – individualism, consumerism, and 
expressionism – they have paved the way for a change in perception of the 
Japanese tradition of employment for life.  The adaptability of expressionism has 
given more flexibility to the youth of Japan.  The emphasis placed on 
individualism and expressionism induces less concern for something larger, such 
as a corporation.  With a generation that has begun to focus largely on his or 
herself rather than the benefit of a bigger group, the age of the salaryman and 
office lady have begun to decline.  Once seen as a hard-working, devoted 
businessman, salarymen are perceived are now seen as “nothing more than latter-
day kamikaze pilots in business suits” (Robertson, 2005, p. 141).  More and more 
young Japanese have begun to “reject the constraints of being a sarariman in a 
corporate society” (Robertson, 2005, p. 136).   The students that participated in 
my surveys exerted some of these characteristics through their reasons why they 
did not prefer lifelong employment at one company. 
 
In addition, many shinjinrui live in the moment and think only of short-
term problems rather than think of what is best for their futures.  They possess 
“narrow and short-sighted perspectives” (Herbig, 1995, p. 52).  This change in 
mindset and values is reflected in the following statistics: 
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The percentage deriving pleasure from work dropped from 29 per cent in 
1970 to less than 20 per cent in 1980 for those aged 20 to 25.  Among 
those under 20, only 25 per cent claim to be prepared to sacrifice their 
lives to a company, compared with 45 per cent of 50 year olds.  In 1940, 
20 year olds wanted above all to 'lead a temperate and honest life to work 
for the good of society'; in the 1980s onwards, young peopel believe that 
the main aim in life is personal pleasure (Herbig, 1995, p. 51). 
The 1980s marks a period in time when attitudes among the Japanese youth began 
to shift.  Ever since then, young Japanese people are becoming more and more 
individualistic.  Rather than work themselves to death, Japanese youth from the 
1980s and after are thinking about how to enjoy themselves.  There is an evident 
disparity between the attitudes of salarymen and that of the shinjinrui.  The object 
of import has changed from the firm to the individual.  The culture of Japan is 
transitioning from one that was “anchored in fixed [Confucian] values” to one of 
“fantasy and desire” (Harootunian, 2001, xix).   
 
With a change in values, attitudes of Japanese students concerning 
education have also changed.  The shinjinrui generally do not place as much 
emphasis on achievements or accomplishments.  Although shinjinrui are mostly 
“wealthy and well-educated university students”, not all of them “have high 
educational attainment or a strong success orientation” (Robertson, 2005, p. 160, 
Kawasaki, 1994, p. 191).  In fact, when prompted to list things that brought them 
anxiety, most Japanese students said, “education, educators, school, university, 
other students, home, parents and personal problems” (Herbig, 1995, p. 52).  
Furthermore, Kawasaki analyzes that for Japanese youth culture, “university is 
like an amusement park” (1994, p. 193).   
 
To this, I can personally attest.  While attending Sophia University, a 
private, prestigious school located in Tokyo, I took classes that were mixed with 
exchange students and Japanese students.  On several occasions, I would look 
around the classroom and see that some of the Japanese students were blatantly 
sleeping in class.   
 
Without education being stressed as much as before among the youth of 
Japan, the aforementioned diploma society that the country once had is now 
weakened.  Shinjinrui do not take school as seriously; they are not concerned with 
obtaining an established career path, and thus they are “ill-equipped for the 
stresses of corporate life in an economic superpower and yearning for escape” 
(Herbig, 1995, p. 50).  This is not to say that all working people of the shinjinrui 
generation are lazy; they work just enough but never more than they should.  
They are “increasingly reluctant to go beyond the call of duty and turn a good-
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enough performance into a superb one”, states Herbig, describing them as the 
“goldfish generation” for the reason that they “have to be hand-fed everything” 
(1995, p. 50).  All of this then forces change upon the corporate environment and 
the system of permanent employment. 
 
  Lifelong employment has become threatened with modernization 
ultimately leading up to the birth of this new type of Japanese youth and its new 
set of values.  The “doctrine of self-sacrifice” has been defied by the shinjinrui 
that do take positions in corporations since the 1980s (Robertson, 2005, p. 141).  
Working shinjinrui have no qualms about changing their occupations multiple 
times throughout their lives or altering management operations.  The quality of 
life in Japan has changed from wanting to work hard for one company to devoting 
more time for oneself.  How can lifelong employment possibly survive if the 
unwavering loyalty and diligence that the Japanese once displayed towards one 
company is vanishing? 
 
Growing Individuality 
 Due to modernization, the advent of shinjinrui, and changing values, the 
Japanese youth have been exerting more individuality.  Soft individualism during 
the 1950s gave way to expressionism during the latter years of the twentieth 
century.  Instead of suppressing their differences, young Japanese have begun to 
pursue their own wants, caring more for their own happiness or attaining self-
actualization.  During the 1990s, kojinshugi, meaning individualism, was “a word 
heard more and more, and almost always in reference to young people” (Herbig, 
1995, p. 51).  One study showed that Japanese students placed great value on 
“individual pursuits – such as exercising, pursuing personal hobbies or being with 
friends” (Herbig, 1995, p. 51). 
 
Similar to the emergence of shinjinrui, a phenomenon known as freeters 
developed in the 1980s.  A freeter is one that holds a series of part-time jobs, 
never obtaining a genuine career, and is more concerned with hobbies or 
independence (Robertson, 2005, p. 136).4  Related to freeters are NEETs, which is 
an acronym that stands for “No Education, Employment, or Training” (Robertson, 
2005, p. 136).  Members of this Japanese youth culture refuse to work at all.  In 
2003, there were at least 400,000 NEETs that fell between the ages of fifteen and 
twenty-four; this figure is five times the amount from 1997 (Robertson, 2005, p. 
136).  This symbolizes how the attitudes of Japanese youth culture are quickly 
changing.  Just from the 1980s to the 1990s, and then another comparison of the 
late 1990s to the 2000s shows that young Japanese people are caring less about 
                                                
4 The term freeter is the result of combining “free” and “Arbeiter”.  The Japanese use the term 
“arubaito” for work.  It is a loan word from German. 
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working hard and more about their own freedom.  Contemporary Japanese youth 
feel less shame if they do not secure stable employment.  They are more 
concerned about their own happiness and comfort. 
 
 Japanese society overall puts significant pressure on the youth, especially 
with entrance exams, parents, and gender dichotomies (Kelly, 1993, p. 530).  
Perhaps Japanese high school and college students want to get away from societal 
pressures such as these.  Such pressures lead to emotional distress, which can 
influence how Japanese students function at school, in public, and ultimately, in 
the workplace.  Borovoy emphasizes hikikomori, which translates to “withdrawn” 
and refers to those that cut themselves off from society (2008, p. 552).  In a 
culture that “has historically prioritized inclusion and mainstreaming as key 
elements of democracy, over the expression of individual rights”, hikikomori 
“would, in a freer society, be designing computer games, handcrafting furniture or 
launching small software startups” (Borovoy, 2008, p. 553).  Such activities 
require ingenuity and freedom of expression.  What provides an escape for this 
young generation of Japanese is partaking in activities that bring them happiness 
instead of doing what others want them to do.  However, the anxiety from social 
pressures leads many hikikomori to refuse school attendance as well as later 
“failing to find a compelling job” after completing college (Borovoy, 2008, p. 
554).  The poor work ethic exemplified by these disturbed youths has contributed 
to the decline of the salaryman.  With less Japanese students working diligently in 
school, there are less that go on to work for companies for the rest of their lives 
until retirement. 
 
 The need to express oneself has influenced other Japanese that do choose 
to obtain a career path.  More and more Japanese are choosing specialized 
occupations that “call for some creativity and a degree of independence” (Herbig, 
1995, p. 51).  There is a possibility that the Japanese youth culture is exerting 
more individuality because they gain no fulfillment following in the footsteps of 
their parents, particularly concerning occupation.  They have noticed that they are 
only making decisions because their parents did it or they are carrying on a 
tradition blindly.  It has become simply a custom to fall into the occupation of a 
salaryman or an office lady, and young Japanese people do not know why they do 
it.  It is only done out of habit, and now they are breaking out of it. 
 
 Japanese entry-level students also feel that they have more choices 
regarding career paths, which leads them to explore their own creativity and 
exercise their individuality in college and also after graduation.  
The student attitude towards graduate school and employment reflected 
their awareness of the realities of life outside of university; with a 
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significant number of them stating that they did not know what they would 
do after graduating” (Lee-Cunin, 2004, p. 138). 
One particular Japanese college student I know replied that she did not know what 
to do when I inquired about post-graduate plans.  She had studied abroad in the 
United States.  Globalization, plus new attitudes and values among her peers and 
having many more career choices, probably affected her answer.  “Japanese 
international youth have become a new privileged group.  Together, these trends 
have begun to break the uniformity that formerly characterized Japanese youth 
culture” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 199). 
 
Even Japanese that have secured employment for life wish to exert more 
individuality and creativity.  Recruit Research Corporation conducted a survey 
that came to the conclusion that “more than half of salaried Japanese workers say 
they would switch jobs or start their own business if a favorable opportunity 
arose” (Tanikawa, 1995, p. 11).  Some salarymen feel “imprisoned by the concept 
of ‘masculinity’”; they wish to leave the workforce to pursue personal interests 
instead (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 247).  The ability to switch occupations and 
the feeling of wanting to do so among the working class has increased in Japan 
since the 1990s, and will probably continue to increase as time goes on.  The 
Japanese have begun to worry less about losing face when they leave a company 
to find a new job.  Globalization has also had an effect on some Japanese 
salarymen, especially those that have attended schools in other countries, showing 
them that workers in other nations do not always stay loyal to one company 
(Tanikawa, 1995, p. 11).   
 
 Due to urbanization in the mid-1900s, the perception of the salaryman has 
become tarnished.  The rigid life of a salaryman, full of sacrifice as he neglects 
his family by working to death, no longer appeals to the Japanese youth of the 
2000s as they aspire to achieve personal goals that reflect feelings of growing 
expressionism.  Consequently, the tradition of lifelong employment in Japan has 
been on the decline since the 1980s and will continue even past the 2000s. 
 
VI. Economic Downturn 
There seems to be much worry among Japanese college students stemming 
from the state of the economy.  Participants of my survey, in addition to college-
age and entry-level Japanese in general, would probably be more willing to fully 
reject the tradition of lifelong employment if the economy of Japan were in a 
better state.   
 
Increasing Amount of Layoffs 
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When considering the state of the economy, lifelong employment, and 
individualism, what we see is a paradox.  Japanese youth wish to express 
themselves freely and choose their own paths with regards to their careers, but at 
the same time, some are concerned with security in a weak global environment 
and welcome employment for life.  However, those that wish to obtain stable jobs 
may be out of luck as the lifelong employment system of Japan is sustaining a 
significant amount of pressure.  Many companies, who have guaranteed their 
employees jobs for life, are increasingly letting more and more of their workers 
go due to economic hardships.  According to Wolff, cited by Jackson, an  
international comparative study of listed companies with more than 2000 
employees found an increasing proportion of Japanese firms downsizing 
their workforce by 10 per cent or more during the recession. In 1991, the 
proportion was 2 per cent; in 2001, it had tripled to 6 per cent; and in 2002, 
it had peaked at close to 11 per cent (2008, p 67-68).   
When companies stated that they would only let their employees go during the 
direst of times, this may have been to what they were referring.  In order to 
survive economically, Japanese organizations are making significant changes to 
their management practices. 
Only companies that are able to implement a rigorous and impartial 
procedure of “selection and concentration” will survive the next couple of 
years.  Companies are only just beginning to understand the dangers of 
maintaining large inventories and are beginning to scale back.  In this new 
corporate reality, businessmen are increasingly subject to demotion and 
firing, making wage labor an unstable source of masculine identity and 
human dignity (Robertson, 2004, p. 141). 
The one that bears the impact of these managerial changes is the salarymen.  
Their perception of loyalty has been shattered with corporations making such 
decisions. 
 
The Disintegration of Devotion 
 As a result of more employees being laid-off by their corporation or 
“substitute family”, they have less motivation to be loyal.  Companies that had 
“aggressively sought experienced workers as well as entry-level college seniors” 
during the 1980s had no other choice but to “cast off many employees… through 
buyouts and dismissals” when the state of the economy fell during the decade 
after (Tanikawa, 1995, p. 11).  Feeling betrayed and disillusioned due to 
“midcareer hirings and midcareer dismissals”, Japanese thus had “a weakened 
national attachment to one job for life” (Tanikawa, 1995, p. 11).   
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In addition, difficult economic circumstances were one of the primary 
reasons that the aforementioned freeters came about during the late 1990s.   
The declining chance of coming across a permanent job to which a young 
person can commit themselves undermines their commitment to a job in 
which they are currently engaged, and results in a rash of unemployment 
and job-switching” (Robertson, 2005, p. 136).  
 
 Japanese companies are also turning to a new source of labor: part-time 
and temporary employees.  Expendable “dispatch workers”, making up nearly a 
third of the work force in the 2000s, are hired temporarily while loyal employees 
are laid off (Parry, 2009, p. 39).  Hamada points out that the “hiring of 
temporaries and female workers is considered a desirable cost-saving strategy” 
(Robertson, 2004, p. 140).   However, since these workers know that they will not 
be with a particular company for the long term, let alone the rest of their lives, 
there is much less dedication for their impermanent employer.   
 
Due to the economic downturn, forcing many companies to lay off their 
dedicated employees and hire new ones that will be around only for so long with 
no real stake in their firm, in addition to those independent Japanese youth that 
have already shunned the tradition in exchange for expressionism, do lifelong 
employment and salarymen stand a chance of surviving? 
 
VII. Gender Issues in Japan 
Gender discrimination has always been a prominent issue in Japan with a 
society dominated by men.  Women are often treated as lesser citizens in regards 
to work, pay, and social status. 
The conventional male response to the women’s movement and the 
demands expressed by women for change up until now has been to 
suppress, ignore, and ridicule them and to dismiss them as a troublesome 
minority (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 248).   
 
The majority of Japanese women do not enjoy the benefits of lifelong 
employment or have the privilege of holding executive positions.  According to 
Herbig, “few become managers – only 1 per cent of section chiefs are women” 
(1995, p. 56).  Generally, Japanese women receive less training than their male 
colleagues, thus decreasing their chances of advancing within the company.  
Japanese women have little opportunity for growth in the corporate realm since 
many Japanese firms hire them solely for tedious, administrative purposes 
(Hirakawa, 2004, p. 431).  Known as office ladies, their male managers refer to 
them as “girls”, indicating their superiority and the incompetence they perceive 
females to have.  Japanese women are greatly hindered from reaching managerial 
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positions by the “system of lifetime employment, the seniority system, and the 
bureaucratic, tightly knit nature of industrial policy” (Robertson, 2004, p. 132).   
 
Japanese women have become tired of the gender discrimination that has 
existed for years.  With the turn of the century, the “stagnated, male-centered 
economy and society [of Japan] have come under attack” (Robertson, 2005, p. 
316).  Japanese women, influenced by the West, see how American woman are 
treated as equals and wish for the same.  The system of lifelong employment, 
dominated by males, is fading as women strive for more equality and 
independence.  With women increasingly making up more and more of the 
workforce in Japan, yet not being included in the lifelong employment system, 
firms will have to rethink their strategies or be forced to eventually give up the 
tradition altogether.  More Japanese men are also realizing that they cannot treat 
their female counterparts as pests. As a result, a select number of Japanese 
husbands are assuming more feminine roles and exerting their own 
expressionism.  
 
Breaking Down the Gender Dichotomy 
Many proponents of gender equality in Japan have encouraged Japanese 
women to consider evaluating Western or American society.  Female  
critics, in discussing women's ideal lifestyles, often encourage women to 
defect to the liberated West, criticizing Japanese society and the Japanese 
male as hopelessly mired in tradition” (Hirakawa, 2004, p. 424).   
 
Modernization between world wars facilitated the notion that “the symbol 
of all that was appealing… in this new, Westernized world, was the modern 
women – an individual who transgressed social boundaries and questioned her 
dependence on men” (Adams, 2009, p. 41).  Some Japanese women actually 
prefer American husbands because they believe that a non-Japanese man will treat 
them as an equal and let them have more independence and mobility.  Revisiting 
the consumer culture that has infiltrated Japanese lifestyles, some Japanese 
women believe that “western styles and goods hold the promise of western-style 
relationships. Westernization of the home indicates a move from feudal relations, 
associated with obligation and hierarchy, to democratic relations, characterized by 
choice” (Tobin, 1992, p. 107).  Hirakawa asserts that “a considerable number of 
middle-class Japanese women do desire to live beyond the prescribed role of 
homebound mother/wife” (2004, p. 435).  They want to be free from the 
obligation of bearing children and taking care of the house.  Instead, more 
Japanese women want to find self-actualization beyond mere maternal roles. 
…the latest research findings also indicate that the image of the self-
sacrificing, nurturing mother may no longer fit a majority of young 
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mothers now in the middle of their childbearing years… research on 
young mothers in their twenties and thirties indicates that this new 
generation does not necessarily subscribe to the believe that kodomo ga 
ikigai (my child is my raison d’être)  (Robertson, 2005, p. 133). 
 
By rejecting traditional feminist roles women are straying from 
conventional Japanese ways.  They wish for the equality and independence that 
the West gives and because “Japanese masculinity has become more and more 
directly linked to corporate employment”, the conventional custom of having one 
career for the rest of their lives probably would not appeal to them (Robertson, 
2005, p. 131). 
 
When I observed Japanese girls during my time abroad, I saw that some 
were still financially and socially dependent upon their boyfriends, most likely 
stemming from Japan’s consumer culture.  However, I did have Japanese friends 
that were independent; they were living on their own in Japan or have studied 
abroad by themselves in the United States.  Perhaps the dependency is beginning 
to dwindle with the combination of individualism and a growing need for 
equality.   
 
Furthermore, although my surveys indicated that most mothers of the 
Japanese youth culture of the 2000s were housewives, it is important to remember 
that it is difficult for people to break out of the highly-patterned culture of Japan.  
In Japan, society expects people to abide by “the security of group-belonging, and 
men and women are relegated to separate spheres – men to the workplace, and 
women to the home” (Hirakawa, 2004, p. 428).   
 
A Salaryman’s Version of Expressionism?  
As the number of Japanese women wanting to be more independent 
increases, Japanese men are beginning to heed to their wishes.  In addition to this, 
the burdensome life of a salarymen exhausts them.  As a result, the traditional 
custom of lifelong employment has become weakened. 
The growing expression of dissatisfaction on the part of women has 
resonated in the hearts of many men precisely because so many issues that 
need to be dealt with have been building up among men themselves.  One 
such issue is that of karoshi, or ‘death resulting from overwork’ 
(Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 249).    
 
 Japanese husbands were beginning to reevaluate their lives during the 
1990s.  A number of salarymen, civil workers, and teachers who wanted to 
redirect their lives while breaking down gender stereotypes founded an 
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organization called Men Concerned about Child Care (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, 
p. 250).  Instead of allowing their wives to assume the traditional feminine role in 
the house, these men took on household responsibilities such as raising the 
children or doing chores.  Similar to the Japanese youth culture and their need for 
freedom and individuality, for these Japanese working men, “spending time with 
family and friends and doing what they personally enjoy is more important to 
them than work-related activities.  Thus, they rarely put in overtime at work and 
do not hesitate to take vacations” (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 251). 
 
 These salarymen seem to be exerting their own type of expressionism. By 
making choices based upon their own wants, the company has come second.  
With a gradually-growing loyalty for one’s family, and the rejection “of a gender-
based division of labor”, the male-dominated system of lifelong employment will 
fall by the wayside (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 251).   
 
 Although the men that share these views are still a “small minority within 
Japanese society… they are beginning to have some impact on [others]” 
(Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 253).  As time progresses with more women’s 
movements and more Japanese men becoming aware of human rights and equality, 
perhaps the society of Japan will give women more sovereignty in the home as 
well as the workplace.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
 Is the tradition of lifelong employment on the road to extinction?  Will the 
once-venerated Japanese salarymen die out along with it?  With all of these 
factors going against them – consumerism, individualism, expressionism, new 
values and attitudes among the Japanese youth culture, a poor economy, and 
gender issues – it seems very possible.  Through various literature and my 
surveys, it is evident that there are attitudes among some young Japanese that 
conflict with the Confucian values that perpetuate the tradition of lifelong 
employment.  Furthermore, the global economic crisis has forced many Japanese 
companies to rethink their hiring strategies, thus contributing to the change. 
 
Some scholars such as Wolff believe that the system of lifelong 
employment will soon be wiped out altogether.  He cites Moriguchi and Ono, who 
concluded with a survey in 2002 that more than half of eight hundred Japanese 
companies could no longer guarantee lifelong employment for their workers 
(Wolff, 2008, p. 67).  From the 1960s to the year 2000, Japanese corporations 
were able to sustain the system of lifelong employment via deployments to other 
office branches (Wolff, 2008, p. 68).  However, it was around the 1990s that 
Japanese firms became more reluctant to offer their workers employment for life, 
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thus marking the “‘death’ or deinstitutionalization of lifelong employment” 
(Wolff, 2008, p. 54). 
 
Although some may say that the tradition of lifelong employment and the 
salarymen of Japan will stay alive with a few conservative firms, this is debatable; 
if those companies want to stay alive and grow, they will probably have to make a 
few changes along with many other Japanese corporations that downsized their 
labor force.  With a depressed economy, employees with dwindling dedication, an 
individualistic youth culture lacking Confucian values, and Japanese women 
rejecting traditional gender roles, the gradual extinction of the lifelong 
employment and the age of the Japanese salarymen are imminent. 
 
VIII. Epilogue 
 The decline of the traditional employment system, despite its gradual 
occurrence, represents a significant shift in Japanese culture and society.  
Essentially, this shift illustrates a change in the Japanese population; an increasing 
amount of Japanese are leaning toward values pertaining to global citizenship.   
The younger generations of Japan, who are interested in pursuing career paths that 
are meaningful to them, have the opportunity to exercise more freedom compared 
to the restriction of one company.  With this, they have more flexibility, creativity, 
and consequently, a greater proclivity to diversity.  This mindset allows Japanese 
youth to find motivation to explore other cultures or languages.  One of the 
students I surveyed in 2009 had a great interest in the German language.  It was 
not for the purpose of Japanese nationalism or for her company, but for her own 
pursuit.  By delving into the German language and culture, she was being a global 
citizen.  Increased intra-cultural communication among the Japanese youth overall 
compared to older generations illustrates an increased inclination towards global 
citizenship. 
 
Haffner, Klett, and Lehmann capture Japan’s post-modern situation 
regarding global citizenship perfectly by saying, “The Japanese people - in the 
sense of 127 million individual Japanese, as opposed to the “one nation” Japan - 
would be on the whole much happier, more self-fulfilled...  They would also be 
far better globally integrated” (2009, p. 14).  With the Japanese youth considering 
more career options and individualism, the result is more global Japanese citizens 
to foster better connections with other nations in the international community. 
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